It did not then appear, however, that the wound was so deep and smarting as subsequent events have shown. Then it was impossible to foresee the far-reaching consequences which have since appeared. It might have been predicted that in the south ill-feeling would be directed towards the Japanese, and that they would suffer temporary and local commercial loss. But few, if any, inclined to the belief that a large and comprehensive movement, extending far and wide throughout the Chinese Empire, and involving in its operations the Chinese residents in the Straits, in Australia, and in California, would grow out of so seemingly small a cause of quarrel. A boycott of Japanese goods was, of course, a possibility, and the recent remarkable unanimity displayed by the great mass of the population in the anti-American crusade, made it not improbable that some such attempt would be made to take revenge. But the main national grievance against America may be held to have affected equally all the important provinces, whereas in this case it was at first possible to hope that the incident would be confined to its local aspect, and further, to entertain a fairly reasonable expectation that the Viceroy who made the mistake, and the province in which it was made, would be allowed to bear the brunt of the resulting punishment in the manner which the history of foreign relations with China would have led any one to regard as customary up to a very few years ago. This expectation derived a certain amount of strength from the fact that, as recently as the end of last year, when the British Admiral and Sir John Jordan agreed upon the employment of the West River patrol as a means of inducing the Viceroy to pay the claim for the "Sainam" some anxiety lest a boycott of British goods might result. But in this case those who contended that nothing of the sort would happen proved to be right. Similar fears were entertained in the north during the temporary excitement over the Chekiang Railway Loan. Again, those who took the view that the rest of China would not feel deeply enough to make the necessary sacrifices were seen to have made the more just estimate of the political forces at work. In the present instance failure to apprehend these arose out of an insufficient realization of the true inwardness of the feelings with which the Chinese regard our allies. That those feelings had been anything but friendly was the common belief, amounting, I imagine, in the case of those who were in China during the war of 1894-5, to conviction. But the memory of that war has long ago grown dim, and it was therefore something in the nature of a revelation to find that the epoch-making events of the intervening years have so little altered the Chinese attitude. The burning nature of the resentment which spread rapidly among the people assuming definite shape in angry protests against the high-handed action of their oldest neighbours must have surprised those who had come to believe in the probability in the near future of Japan and China making common cause against the influence and commerce of the West. To some who had previously gone in fear of this the recrudescence of a state of matters rendering that particular aspect of the yellow peril more visionary and remote than it had hitherto appeared came as a relief, and it is, I fear, hardly overstating the case to say that many derived no little satisfaction out of the embarrassments created for the Japanese by this unexpected turn of events. A not very noble satisfaction has shone through much of the press comment made, and led to the growth among the Japanese here of an unfortunate impression that the movement is being aided and abetted by European firms. As regards the Chinese employés of European firms, it is difficult to say in how far this impression may or may not be true. It is obviously difficult for a "taipan" to control his compradore in an affair of this kind. But, as regards the European heads of firms, the impression, generally speaking, is as inaccurate as it is unfortunate. And for this reason, if for no other: Every responsible man must realize that a weapon is being experimented with which may at any moment be turned his way, and which, if perfected as a result of trial, will eventually be felt by European traders and ship-owners to be a weapon of appalling weight and power.
As a community of middlemen, mainly dependent upon commerce between China and Europe, this Colony cannot afford to encourage the growth of any such danger, and to say that the Government and the leading residents realize this is only to say that they are alive to the very obvious facts of our somewhat precarious existence. Representations have been made from Tokio which would seem to indicate that opinion there accuses Hong Kong of being made the willing centre of the boycott. Officially the Colony is not guilty, the Government has done its best to restrain the movement; commercially there is no such certainty possible, but as far as it can be ascertained the verdict deserves to be the same. Our Japanese friends are not unnaturally suspicious. It is perhaps only natural that the troubles which have been brought upon them by a diplomatic blunder should tend to make them uneasy, and should cause them to feel resentment towards those who are profiting by the accident of their difficult position.
The position of Japan is, indeed, difficult. If she takes strong measures the chances are that the evil will only be increased thereby; on the other hand, if she remains passive, relying upon the friendly hand of time or some unlooked for diversion to work a cure, who shall say for how long she may not have to wait?
The problem bids fair to try the national temper more than anything that has hitherto happened in the short history of new Japan.
Yours faithfully,
(Signed)
M. STEWART, Chairman.
2
It did not then appear, however, that the wound was so deep and smarting as subsequent events have shown. Then it was impossible to foresee the far-reaching consequences which have since appeared. It might have been predicted that in the south ill-feeling would be directed towards the Japanese, and that they would suffer temporary and local commercial loss. But few, if any, inclined to the belief that a large and comprehensive movement, extending far and wide throughout the Chinese Empire, and involving in its operations the Chinese residents in the Straits, in Australia, and in California, would grow out of so seemingly small a cause of quarrel. A boycott of Japanese goods was, of course, a possibility, and the recent remarkable unanimity displayed by the great mass of the population in the anti-American crusade, made it not improbable that some such attempt would be made to take revenge. But the main national grievance against America may be held to have affected equally all the important provinces, whereas in this case it was at first possible to hope that the incident would be confined to its local aspect, and further, to entertain a fairly reasonable expectation that the Viceroy who made the mistake, and the province in which it was made, would be allowed to bear the brunt of the resulting punishment in the manner which the history of foreign relations with China would have led any one to regard as customary up to a very few years ago. This expectation derived a certain amount of strength from the fact that, as recently as the end of last year, when the British Admiral and Sir John Jordan agreed upon the employment of the West River patrol as a means of inducing the Viceroy to pay the claim for the "Sainam" some anxiety lest a boycott of British goods might result. But in this case those who piracy, there was contended that nothing of the sort would happen proved to be right. Similar fears were entertained in the north during the temporary excitement over the Chekiang Railway Loan. Again, those who took the view that the rest of China would not feel deeply enough to make the necessary sacrifices were seen to have made the more just estimate of the political forces at work. In the present instance failure to apprehend these arose out of an insufficient realization of the true inwardness of the feelings with which the Chinese regard our allies. That those feelings had been anything but friendly was the common belief, amounting, I imagine, in the case of those who were in China during the war of 1894-5, to conviction. But the memory of that war has long ago grown dim, and it was therefore something in the nature of a revelation to find that the epoch- making events of the intervening years have so little altered the Chinese attitude. The burning nature of the resentment which spread rapidly among the people assuming definite shape in angry protests against the high-handed action of their oldest neighbours must have surprised those who had come to believe in the probability in the near future of Japan and China making common cause against the influence and commerce of the West. To some who had previously gone in fear of this the recrudescence of a state of matters rendering that particular aspect of the yellow peril more visionary and remote than it had hitherto appeared came as a relief, and it is, I fear, hardly overstating the case to say that many derived no little satisfaction out of the embarrassments created for the Japanese by this unexpected turn of events. A not very noble satisfaction has shone through much of the press comment made, and led to the growth among the Japanese here of an unfortunate impression that the movement is being aided and abetted by European firms. As regards the Chinese employés of European firms, it is difficult to say in how far this impression may or may not be true. It is obviously difficult for a "taipan" to control his compradore in an affair of this kind. But, as regards the European heads of firms, the impression, generally speaking, is as inaccurate as it is unfortunate. And for this reason, if for no other: Every responsible man must realize that a weapon is being experimented with which may at any moment be turned his way, and which, if perfected as a result of trial, will eventually be felt by European traders and ship-owners to be a weapon of appalling weight and power.
As a community of middlemen, mainly dependent upon commerce between China and Europe, this Colony cannot afford to encourage the growth of any such danger, and to say that the Government and the leading residents realize this is only to say that they are alive to the very obvious facts of our somewhat precarious existence. Representations have been made from Tokio which would seem to indicate that opinion there accuses Hong Kong of being made the willing centre of the boycott. Officially the Colony is not guilty, the Government has done its best to restrain the movement; commercially there is no such certainty possible, but as far as it can be ascertained the verdict deserves to be the same. Our Japanese friends are not unnaturally suspicious. It is perhaps only natural that the troubles which have been brought upon them by a
KC
diplomatic blunder should tend to make them uneasy, and should cause them to feel resentment towards those who are profiting by the accident of their difficult position.
The position of Japan is, indeed, difficult. If she takes strong measures the chances are that the evil will only be increased thereby; on the other hand, if she remains passive, relying upon the friendly hand of time or some unlooked for diversion to work a cure, who shall say for how long she may not have to wait?
The problem bids fair to try the national temper more than anything that has hitherto happened in the short history of new Japan.
Yours faithfully, (Signed)
M. STEWART, Chairman.
822
1
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